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ABSTRACT
In its seminal Markman decision, the Supreme Court sought to usher in a more
effective, transparent patent litigation regime through its ruling that “the construction of a
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the
court.” In the aftermath of this decision, the Federal Circuit adhered to its prior holding
that claim construction is a “purely legal issue” subject to plenary de novo review,
downplaying the Supreme Court’s more nuanced description of claim construction as a
“mongrel practice” merely “within the province of the court.” Over nearly two decades of
experience in the post-Markman era, it has become apparent that the Federal Circuit’s
adherence to its plenary de novo appellate review standard has frustrated district courts’
distinctive capabilities to apprehend and resolve the factual disputes inherent in claim
construction determinations, undermined the transparency of the claim construction
process, discouraged detailed and transparent explanations of claim construction
reasoning, and produced unusual and at times alarming levels of appellate reversals.
These effects have cast doubt on the predictability of patent litigation, discouraged
settlements, delayed resolution of patent disputes, and run up the overall costs of patent
litigation. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision, this brief advocates a balanced,
structurally sound, legally appropriate, hybrid standard of appellate review that would
promote more accurate and efficient patent dispute resolution. Factual determinations
underlying claim construction rulings should be subject to the “clearly erroneous”
standard of review, while the Federal Circuit should retain de novo review over the
ultimate claim construction decision. In this manner, district court judges, in their
capacity as fact-finders, could better surmount the distinctive challenges posed by the
technical, mixed fact/law controversies inherent in patent claim construction.
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1
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
1
OF AMICI CURIAE
The authors of this brief are law professors who
study and teach intellectual property law.
Professor Peter S. Menell holds a law degree and
a doctorate degree in economics. Since law school, he
has focused a significant portion of his research on
intellectual property law. Soon after joining the
University of California at Berkeley School of Law
faculty in 1990, he laid the groundwork to establish
the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology (BCLT).
Since its founding in 1995, BCLT has sought to foster
the beneficial and ethical understanding of intellectual property (IP) law and related fields as they affect
public policy, business, science and technology
through a broad range of public policy conferences,
collaboration with government agencies (U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office, Federal Trade Commission),
interaction with intellectual property practitioners
and technology companies, and research and educational initiatives. BCLT has provided a valuable
1

Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, amici note that no counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
amici curiae made a monetary contribution to its preparation or
submission. We have received letters from Petitioners and
Respondents Sandoz Inc. and Momenta Pharmaceuticals Inc.
consenting to the filing of this brief. Respondents Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Mylan Inc., and Natco Pharma Ltd. have
authorized blanket consent with the Clerk’s Office.
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ongoing vantage point for viewing the evolution of the
high technology field as well as the challenges posed
by legal protection for computer software for inventors, start-up companies, entrepreneurs, established
technology companies, patent professionals, government officials, jurists, and the public. Since 1998,
Professor Menell has organized and taught more than
50 judicial education programs for the Federal Judicial Center on intellectual property law, including an
annual multi-day program for 30-45 federal judges
that covers patent case management with particular
attention devoted to claim construction. That experience led him to develop and co-author a treatise
for federal judges. See Peter S. Menell, Lynn H.
Pasahow, James Pooley & Matthew D. Powers, Fed.
Judicial Ctr., Patent Case Management Judicial
Guide (1st ed. 2009, 2d ed. forthcoming (adding
Steven C. Carlson and Jeffrey G. Homrig)). From
June 2012 through June 2013, Professor Menell
served as one of the inaugural Thomas Alva Edison
Visiting Professionals at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) where he devoted a substantial
part of his work to improving patent claim clarity.
These efforts have informed his research on claim
construction jurisprudence and patent case management.
Professor J. Jonas Anderson teaches patent law
and trade secret law at American University’s Washington College of Law and has also taught intellectual
property-related courses at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law. He previously clerked
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on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and worked as a patent litigation associate at
the Silicon Valley Office of Latham & Watkins. His
research has focused on evaluating the institutional
design of the patent system and improving the clarity
of patent claims.
Professor Arti K. Rai teaches patent law and
administrative law at Duke Law School. Professor
Rai has also taught intellectual property law at
Harvard, Yale, and the University of Pennsylvania
law schools. Prior to entering academia, Professor Rai
clerked for a trial judge who presided over numerous
patent cases in the Northern District of California;
worked on patent litigation as an associate at the
Washington D.C. office of Jenner & Block; and was a
litigation attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice.
From 2009 to 2010, Professor Rai served as the
Administrator of the Office of External Affairs at the
USPTO. As External Affairs Administrator, Professor
Rai led the policy analysis of legislation aimed at
improving patent quality that ultimately became the
America Invents Act of 2011. Professor Rai is also a
public member of the Administrative Conference of
the United States. Based on this background, Professor Rai is committed to improving judicial and administrative processes in patent law.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the seminal Markman decision, this Court
sought to usher in a more effective, transparent patent litigation regime through its ruling that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman
II), 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). Notwithstanding the
constitutional right to patent jury trials, this Court
ruled that claim construction would no longer be conducted by lay jurors in shrouded deliberations. Rather, based on historical analysis of the role of juries
in patent cases, characterization of the nature of
claim construction, and a comparative assessment of
judicial institutional capabilities, this Court concluded that the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury
did not extend to claim construction and that trial
judges were better equipped than juries to resolve the
mixed fact/law controversies inherent in construing
disputed patent claim terms.
In the aftermath of Markman II, the Federal
Circuit adhered to its Markman decision, Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967
(1995) (en banc) – that claim construction is a “purely
legal issue” subject to plenary de novo review, see
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) – downplaying this
Court’s more nuanced description of claim construction as a “mongrel practice” merely “within the
province of the court.” Markman II, 517 U.S. at
372, 378. Over nearly two decades of experience in
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the post-Markman era, it has become apparent that
the Federal Circuit’s adherence to its Markman I
plenary de novo appellate review standard has frustrated district courts’ distinctive capabilities to apprehend and resolve the factual disputes inherent in
claim construction determinations, undermined the
transparency of the claim construction process,
discouraged detailed and transparent explanations of
claim construction reasoning, and produced unusual
and at times alarming levels of appellate reversals.
These effects have cast doubt on the predictability of
patent litigation, discouraged settlements, delayed
resolution of patent disputes, and run up the overall
costs of patent litigation.
This Court’s Markman II decision points toward
a balanced, structurally sound, legally appropriate,
hybrid standard of appellate review that would promote more accurate and efficient patent dispute
resolution. Factual determinations underlying claim
construction rulings should be subject to the “clearly
erroneous” standard of review, while the Federal
Circuit should retain de novo review over the ultimate claim construction decision. In this manner, district court judges, in their capacity as fact-finders,
could better surmount the distinctive challenges
posed by the technical, mixed fact/law controversies
inherent in patent claim construction. A hybrid standard would encourage district judges to identify the
“person of ordinary skill in the art” and, where appropriate, build fuller, more transparent records to
support their claim construction decisions. These
effects would promote clearer substantive analysis,
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more settlements following claim construction and
trial, more effective appellate review, and fewer reversals and remands.
A hybrid appellate standard is unlikely to undermine the national uniformity of the patent system.
In any event, concerns about national uniformity and
clarity of patent claims are more appropriately addressed through improvements to the patent prosecution process, meaningful implementation of the 35
U.S.C. §112(b) claim indefiniteness standard, postgrant review and reexamination procedures, consolidation of claim construction through multi-district
litigation, and adjustments to substantive claim construction jurisprudence.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

Cybor’s Plenary De Novo Standard of Review Misapprehends the Mixed Fact/Law
Nature of Patent Claim Construction

It has long been established that district judges
must step into the shoes of persons having ordinary
skill in the relevant art to resolve disputes as to
proper construction of patent claim terms. More than
a century ago, Professor William Callyhan Robinson
explained that:
the court may have recourse to any testimony to explain the meaning of its language,
or to expert evidence to ascertain the essential characteristics of the described invention
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and the differences between it and other patented inventions, or to papers in the Patent
Office which are connected with the patent
or whose contents were known to the inventor at the date of his application, to show the
significance which he attached to the terms
that he employed.
2 WILLIAM CALLYHAN ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 248 (1890) (footnote omitted).
Robinson further explained that “of whatever aid the
courts avail themselves, their interpretation must be
based upon the patent as it stands, and when its
scope is once fairly apparent it can neither be limited
nor extended by extraneous evidence.” Id.
This same basic framework applies today. Yet the
Federal Circuit’s en banc Cybor ruling, recently
reaffirmed in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips
Electronics North America Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (en banc), holds that patent claim construction is a pure question of law, overriding the more
nuanced interplay of documentary sources (the patent
record) and historical facts (understandings of skilled
artisans).2
This Court’s Markman II decision provides the
foundation for resolving this conundrum. In construing the term “inventory” as used in a claim to
2

Although Professor Robinson characterized claim construction as a “question of law,” it was unclear whether he was referring to the ultimate question. Furthermore, he wrote before
the promulgation of FED. R. CIV. P. 52.
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a dry-cleaning inventory control system, the jury accepted the patentee expert’s testimony regarding the
understanding of the term in the art and accordingly
found infringement. On post-trial motions, the judge
overturned the jury’s verdict, explaining that the
expert’s testimony regarding the definition of “inventory” conflicted with “the ordinary and customary
meaning of [this term], as well as the obvious meaning intended by the patentee, determined from the
specifications, the drawings and the file histories of
the original patent and the patent-in-suit.” Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
In upholding the district court’s judgment, a majority of the Federal Circuit sitting en banc concluded
that the construction of patent claims is properly “a
matter of law” that should not be given to the jury
because of “the fundamental principle of American
law that ‘the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court.’ ” Markman I, 52 F.3d at 978
(citations omitted). Over vehement dissents, the majority concluded that “[b]ecause claim construction is
a matter of law, the construction given the claims is
reviewed de novo on appeal.” Id. at 979.
Rebuffing the patentee’s Seventh Amendment
challenge, the majority also masked the inherently
factual nature of claim construction by arguing that
although the trial judge may use:
certain extrinsic evidence that the court
finds helpful and reject[ ] other evidence as
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unhelpful, and resolv[e] disputes en route to
pronouncing the meaning of claim language
as a matter of law based on the patent documents themselves, the court is not crediting
certain evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the
court is looking to the extrinsic evidence to
assist in its construction of the written document, a task it is required to perform.
Id. at 981 (italics in original) (footnote omitted).
Although this Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the Seventh Amendment did not
require that claim construction be resolved by juries,
it reached this result through very different reasoning. See Markman II, 517 U.S. at 372. Failing to find
clear historical evidence of how claim construction
was handled in 1791, this Court turned to “the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the
statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the
allocation.” Id. at 384. The Court came down firmly
on the side of allocating claim construction to the trial
judge in view of judges’ “training in exegesis [of written instruments],” id. at 388, notwithstanding what it
characterized as the “mongrel practice” of patent
claim construction, id. at 378. In a critical passage,
the Court explained:
It is, of course, true that credibility judgments have to be made about the experts
who testify in patent cases, and in theory
there could be a case in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was equally
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consistent with a patent’s internal logic. But
our own experience with document construction leaves us doubtful that trial courts will
run into many cases like that. In the main,
we expect, any credibility determinations
will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document,
required by the standard construction rule
that a term can be defined only in a way that
comports with the instrument as a whole.
Thus, in these cases a jury’s capabilities to
evaluate demeanor, to sense the ‘mainsprings of human conduct,’ or to reflect community standards, are much less significant
than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of
the patent. The decisionmaker vested with
the task of construing the patent is in the
better position to ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports with
the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to
treat construction of terms of art like many
other responsibilities that we cede to a judge
in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.
Id. at 389-90 (citations omitted).
In contrast with the Federal Circuit’s Markman I
decision, this Court did not deem patent claim construction a “pure question of law.” Rather, consistent
with its characterization of claim construction as
a “mongrel practice,” this Court noted merely that
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claim construction was a matter “exclusively within
the province of the court.” Markman II, 517 U.S. at
372.
Barely two weeks after the Supreme Court’s
Markman II ruling, a Federal Circuit panel heavily
discounted the use of extrinsic evidence, warning that
“[a]llowing the public record to be altered or changed
by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would make this right meaningless.”
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In contrast, various other
Federal Circuit opinions viewed claim construction as
a “mixed question of law and fact” for which fact
finding would be set aside only upon a showing of
clear error. See Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d
938 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102
F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasizing a passage
from Markman II noting that claim construction
“falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact”).
This split precipitated the Federal Circuit’s en
banc review of the appellate claim construction standard in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138
F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In a sharply divided
decision, the Federal Circuit majority reaffirmed that
claim construction is purely a legal issue subject to de
novo appellate review: “the standard of review in
Markman I . . . was not changed by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Markman II, and we therefore
reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review
claim construction de novo on appeal including any
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allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.” Id. at 1456. The majority downplayed this
Court’s characterization of claim construction as a
“ ‘mongrel practice’ ” “ ‘falling somewhere between a
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact’ ”
as merely “prefatory comments.” See Cybor, 138 F.3d
at 1455 (quoting Markman II, 517 U.S. at 378, 388).
The Cybor majority justified plenary de novo
review on a misapprehension of the block quotation
from pages 389-90 of Markman II excerpted above.
This Court noted that its own “experience with document construction” left it “doubtful” that there would
be many cases “in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to choose between experts whose
testimony was equally consistent with a patent’s
internal logic.” Id. at 389. It then observed that “[i]n
the main, we expect, any credibility determinations
will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated
analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined
only in a way that comports with the instrument as a
whole.” Id. From this inference, this Court reasoned
that the trial judge – possessing the
trained ability to evaluate the testimony in
relation to the overall structure of the patent
. . . is in the better position to ascertain
whether an expert’s proposed definition fully
comports with the specification and claims
and so will preserve the patent’s internal coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of
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art like many other responsibilities that we
cede to a judge in the normal course of trial,
notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.
Id. at 390.
While the sentence noting that “any credibility
determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document”
might be read in isolation to downplay the factual
underpinnings of claim construction, the following
sentence discussing the “many other responsibilities”
ceded to the trial judge indicates that this Court
intended the opposite. In that sentence, this Court
analogized claim construction to rulings that a trial
judge routinely resolves during the course of trial –
rulings which are not subject to de novo review. See
Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer:
Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267, 289-91 (2005)
(observing that “[c]ourts commonly recite the deferential ‘abuse of discretion’ test as broadly and generally
appropriate on review of evidence calls”).
That the Cybor majority missed this subtlety is
apparent in its suggestion that “[n]othing in the
Supreme Court’s opinion supports the view that the
Court endorsed a silent, third option – that claim
construction may involve subsidiary or underlying
questions of fact.” Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455. In the accompanying footnote to this sentence, the Cybor
majority reasons that “[i]f this were so, surely the
Supreme Court would have discussed whether subsidiary or underlying fact questions should be decided

14
by the judge or the jury.” Id. at 1455 n.4. This Court’s
passage quoted above, however, analogizes the trial
judge’s “trained ability to evaluate the testimony in
relation to the overall structure of the patent” to the
“many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge
in the normal course of trial.” Markman II, 517 U.S.
at 390. In so stating, this Court justifies leaving the
entire claim construction exercise in the trial judge’s
hands “notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings” – i.e., its factual character. See id. Following
this logic, subsidiary factual issues in claim construction rulings, “like the many other responsibilities that
we cede to a judge in the normal course of a trial,”
would be subject to a more deferential standard of
review. See id.
In this way, Cybor overlooked the potential for
subsidiary factual questions – such as whether a
patent claim term has special meaning to a skilled
artisan. Such understanding could well be trumped
by the intrinsic record, as occurred in the Markman
case. Nonetheless, Cybor’s rejection of any role for
subsidiary fact-finding in claim construction determinations misapprehended essential aspects of the
search for patent claim meaning. The Federal Circuit
perpetuated this misreading of Markman II in its
recent ruling upholding the Cybor de novo standard on stare decisis grounds. See Lighting Ballast
Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). The dissent in Lighting Ballast confronted the appropriate standard of
review and concluded that de novo review of claim
construction rulings “misapprehends the Supreme
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Court’s guidance, contravenes the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and adds considerable uncertainty
and expense to patent litigation.” See id. at 1297
(O’Malley, J., dissenting).
II.

The Post-Markman Era Has Revealed Serious Failings of Plenary De Novo Review
of Claim Construction Rulings

Over the nearly two decades since the Markman
decisions, it has become apparent that the Federal
Circuit’s adherence to its Markman I appellate standard has frustrated district judges’ distinctive capabilities to apprehend and resolve the factual disputes
underlying claim construction determinations, undermined the transparency of the claim construction
process, discouraged detailed and transparent explanations of claim construction reasoning, and produced
unusual and at times alarming levels of appellate
reversals.
Following Markman, trial judges initially sought
to apply their experience gathering and weighing
evidence, including expert testimony, to this challenging new responsibility. While properly emphasizing
the primacy of intrinsic evidence to claim construction, the Vitronics/Cybor line of cases unfortunately
steered district judges away from learning from
skilled artisans and using evidentiary techniques for
resolving disputes among purported experts. An unusually high reversal rate for claim construction rulings following the Cybor decision signaled dissensus.
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See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later:
Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 231, 232-34 (2005). The de novo standard severely constrained, if not effectively deprived,
district judges of resort to an essential tool – focused
evidentiary hearings – for resolving disputes over the
meaning of scientific and technological terms. With
rare exception, federal district judges lack science or
engineering training. See S. Jay Plager, Abolish the
Court of Federal Claims? A Question of Democratic
Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 797 (2003) (observing that “[m]ost district court judges do not have
scientific training, and most have not chosen law
clerks with technical or patent backgrounds”). Yet
claim construction doctrine demands that judges interpret patent claims from the standpoint of “persons
having ordinary skill in the art.”
Although Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), afforded trial judges greater
leeway to gather extrinsic evidence, district judges
have long since abandoned formal evidentiary proceedings as part of the claim construction process and
steered clear of explaining claim construction rulings
as based on any fact-finding. In research examining
the effect of the Phillips decision on reversal rates
and other aspects of patent claim construction, two
of us found that the reversal rate for claim construction appeals has declined in the past decade. See
Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis
of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1
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(2013). Our research indicates, however, that the
decline can be attributed to informal deference rather
than improved fact-finding or more transparency in
the decision-making process. The shadow of formal
de novo review continues to cast doubt on the predictability of patent litigation, discourage settlements
following claim construction and trial, delay resolution of patent disputes, and run up the overall costs of
patent litigation. Although informal deference may
well be an improvement over pure de novo review, it
falls short of the proper division of responsibility
between district and appellate courts and represents
at best an entirely discretionary and panel-dependent
regime.
More fundamentally, the Cybor majority’s failure
to acknowledge the role for fact-finding deprives the
patent adjudication system of the evidentiary record
and systematic analysis essential to sound administration of justice. Because of the de novo standard,
district judges lack motivation to delve beyond the
intrinsic record. In fact, as this case illustrates, litigants risk reversal on appeal to the extent that they
persuade a judge to rely upon extrinsic evidence.
Furthermore, trial judges appropriately perceive that
relying on extrinsic evidence in their claim construction ruling could be grounds for reversal. As a result,
the skilled artisan’s perspective is rarely reflected in
trial judges’ Markman rulings. For this reason, the
Federal Circuit makes nearly all of its claim construction decisions without reference to the skilled artisan’s perspective. See Anderson & Menell, supra, at 5
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(finding that only 13 of the 778 (1.7%) claim construction appellate opinions issued from 2000 to 2010 even
identify the applicable skilled artisan).
In addition to compromising the care and logic
that comes from building a detailed factual record
and preparing a reasoned opinion, the plenary de
novo review regime undermines the appellate process. The parties, the public, and the appellate court
lack the fully developed record and reasoned opinions
that would enable them to know all of the relevant
input and what influenced the trial judge’s decision.
Instead, plenary de novo review substitutes independent review of an anemic record – typically limited to the intrinsic evidence. See Anderson & Menell,
supra, at 45 (finding that in construing claim terms,
the Federal Circuit has consulted extrinsic sources
only 26.3% of the time since 2005).
The private and social costs of the plenary de
novo standard of review include lower quality decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels,
higher costs of litigation as a result of more appeals
and retrials following reversals, greater litigation
uncertainty, longer case pendency and litigation costs
as a result of fewer and delayed settlements, the
distraction and disruption of litigation on the technology marketplace, and the added burdens on the
particular judges and the larger judicial system.
Many of these costs derive from the discouraging
effect of plenary de novo review on early settlement of
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patent cases. The cost of an appeal typically pales in
comparison to the costs of litigating a patent case
through trial. Consequently, parties who lose at trial
are more likely to pursue an appeal under the plenary de novo standard than they would under a more
deferential regime. This not only delays resolution,
but also results in a substantial number of retrials.
Overall, the plenary de novo standard has raised the
cost of patent litigation without any discernible
benefits in terms of improved decision-making.
III. A Hybrid Appellate Review Standard for
Claim Construction Rulings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) provides
that “[f ]indings of fact, whether based on oral or
other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the
witnesses’ credibility.” See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
Thus, the Federal Circuit must defer to trial
judges’ factual determinations in claim construction
rulings. Since the patent document defines the invention, the Federal Circuit retains a substantial
check on the overall claim construction determination
through de novo authority over the intrinsic record
and over whether a trial court’s factual finding contradicts limitations on the the patent’s scope reflected
in the intrinsic evidence – the patent document and
file wrapper.
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The basis for “deferring” to lower court claim
constructions is not trial judges’ policy expertise or
experience vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit but rather
the inherently factual aspects of some parts of patent
claim construction – in particular, the meaning of a
contested claim term from the perspective of a skilled
artisan at a particular moment in time. The mongrel
character of patent claim construction indicates that
a reviewing court should be cautious in overturning a
district court’s well-supported claim construction
absent clear intrinsic evidence to the contrary. Unlike
a statute (which is viewed from a lay perspective), the
intrinsic evidence in a patent case is viewed from the
standpoint of a skilled artisan.
The process of understanding this standpoint
should begin, as current claim construction practice
does, with the trial judge attempting to determine the
plain and ordinary meaning of the patent claim terms
within the context of the claim. The trial judge should
then determine whether the claim term has particular meaning based on its usage in the patent
specification, technical art, and/or claim drafting
convention. Cf. John M. Golden, Construing Patent
Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”:
A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 348-62 (2008). The more deferential standard of appellate review would invigorate trial courts’ development of the factual record.
Although this standard could produce “battles of the
experts,” it should not do so any more in claim construction cases than it does in other areas in which
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courts must view documents or other evidence from a
specialized standpoint.
Furthermore, hybrid standards are already pervasive in patent law. For example, as this Court has
long recognized, the pivotal patent validity doctrine
of nonobviousness requires the trial court to make
factual findings that underpin the ultimate legal conclusion. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 426-27 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1 (1966). Moreover, as this Court has emphasized, the Federal Circuit must follow ordinary legal
rules by reviewing factual findings under the deferential standard of Rule 52(a). See Dennison Mfg. Co. v.
Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810-11 (1986) (per
curiam).
It is important for trial judges to incorporate into
their analysis the overarching notice goal of the patent system. As Professor Robinson explained more
than a century ago, intrinsic evidence should play a
central and critical role in claim construction. But
courts should not be constrained in their use of expert
witnesses in determining the manner in which a patent would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
the art. Indeed, in some cases, it may be impossible to
interpret a claim correctly without the assistance of
experts in the relevant field.
In practice, this proposed standard of review,
consistent with Markman II, will introduce a hybrid
character to appellate review depending on the quality of the patent disclosure, nature of the disputed

22
claim term (technical, common parlance, or glossary),
evidentiary record, and the rationale for the trial
court’s construction. Where the patent clearly defines
the disputed term, there will be little or no role for
extrinsic evidence or fact-finding. But where the patent instrument is opaque, the specification does not
address the term (as occurs with some frequency
when claims are amended), or the term arguably diverges from common parlance, then the judge’s resolution of conflicting testimony takes on much greater
moment.
Such an approach comports with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a) and mirrors the general framework in which district judges operate. Over time, the
district courts will likely better account for the
fact/law distinction in their Patent Local Rules and
Markman hearings. For example, courts could require
litigants to more clearly set forth the intrinsic and
extrinsic bases for claim construction, requiring a
party seeking to bring forward expert testimony to
disclose any gaps in the intrinsic record that skilled
artisan testimony could fill. Furthermore, courts
could innovate in the use of focused evidentiary
hearings, possibly in conjunction with tutorials, for
efficiently developing a factual record for claim construction.
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IV. The Hybrid Appellate Review Standard,
“National Uniformity,” and the Role of the
USPTO
The Federal Circuit based its plenary de novo
standard in part on promoting better notice, certainty, and national uniformity of patent boundaries.
The logic appears to be that as the national appellate
patent court, the Federal Circuit is uniquely positioned to provide nationally uniform interpretations
of patent boundaries. While these are worthy goals,
it is doubtful that plenary de novo review of claim
construction rulings can ever serve these goals effectively due to structural and practical problems.
At the structural level, courts lack authority to
declare the boundaries of a patent beyond the parties
in suit. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Thus, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of a patent in one case cannot be
asserted offensively by the patentee in a later infringement action against other defendants. At most,
it can bar the patentee from seeking an alternative
interpretation. Because the patent system has no
mechanism for conclusively establishing patent scope
with regard to all potential infringers, the certainty
that flows from appellate interpretations is not ironclad, as subsequent defendants can potentially bring
new evidence or more effective advocacy to bear on
claim meaning. While plenary de novo review increases the likelihood that the Federal Circuit will
construe a patent in the same manner across cases,
it also decreases certainty by making district court
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claim constructions more vulnerable to reversal. See
Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal
Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109
(2010).
If the Federal Circuit’s construction of a term in a
particular patent claim cannot bind even subsequent
defendants against whom that patent claim term is
asserted, it can hardly create any binding guidance
for litigation of third-party patents that happen to
use the same term. Indeed, given the variability of
patent claim terms, and the fact that terms must be
construed in light of the specification and other intrinsic evidence, even the precedential value of a
given construction is likely to be limited. Precedential
value is likely to arise not from any conclusion the
Federal Circuit reaches about a particular term but
rather from generalizable rules it applies in reaching
that conclusion. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1086-87 (2003).
With respect to those generalizable rules, which represent the pivotal components of a nationally uniform
patent system, our proposed hybrid standard would
mandate de novo review.
At a more practical level, the sheer number of
patents (and patent claims) issued annually by the
Patent Office severely limits the Federal Circuit’s
ability to provide more than a thimble-sized solution
to an ocean-sized challenge. The Federal Circuit is
able to review a very small subset of the millions of
patent claims granted each year, and this review
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occurs only after years of litigation and typically
millions of dollars spent on litigation.
Concerns about the clarity of patent claims
are more appropriately addressed through improvements to the patent prosecution process, post-grant
review and reexamination, consolidation of claim
construction through multi-district litigation, and adjustments to substantive claim construction jurisprudence. The Patent Office should play a more central
role in achieving clear patent boundaries at the front
end and developing taxonomies, search tools, and
other mechanisms for reinvigorating the patent system’s role in resource planning. See generally Peter S.
Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and
Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2013).
This Court’s decision in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., No. 13-369, 2014 WL 2440536 (June 2,
2014) encourages patent applicants and the USPTO to
place greater emphasis on patent claim clarity.
The Patent Office should impose greater responsibility on patentees to delineate their claims at the
front end of the patent process by requiring applicants to: (1) set forth their claims in a standardized,
detailed format that delineates each claim restriction
in a separate field; (2) specifically define any potentially ambiguous claim terms – including terms
of degree (such as “approximately,” “substantially”);
(3) designate a default dictionary for guiding the interpretation of any undefined claim terms; (4) hyperlink
to or otherwise specify the corresponding “structure, material, or acts” in means-plus-function claim
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elements; and (5) consent to recordation of interviews. See Peter S. Menell, Promoting Patent Claim
Clarity (Nov. 1, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2171287; Peter S. Menell,
It’s Time to Make Vague Software Patents More Clear,
WIRED (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.wired.com/opinion/
2013/02/its-time-to-make-vague-software-patents-moreclear/. The dispute over the meaning of the claim
term in this case (as well as the many other cases,
including Phillips, dealing with the presumption that
a claim is governed by 35 U.S.C. §112(f)) could likely
have been avoided if the USPTO required applicants
to simply check a box to indicate whether or not they
intended to invoke 35 U.S.C. §112(f). The court can
encourage such policies more generally by developing
a contra proferentem (interpretation against the
draftsperson) principle for claim construction.
The past decade has revealed that the Patent
Office’s lax review of claim boundaries is penny-wise
and pound-foolish. Failure to scrutinize claim language at the front end of the patent system causes far
more harm than good, even if only a small percentage
of patents are litigated. It has led to proliferation of
poorly drafted patent claims, which contributes to
reckless patent assertion, complicates technology
licensing, fuels uncertainty in patent litigation, and
runs up the litigation and social costs of the patent
system.
The Patent Office is paying greater attention
to problems of patent notice. It has implemented
guidelines for patent examiners that appear to be
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increasing rejections of unclear or poorly drafted
claims and it is systematically engaging stakeholders
in discussions of what other actions it can take. The
USPTO is also making vigorous use of the new postgrant review powers under the America Invents Act.
Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality
Through the Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
503 (2013).
To be sure, much remains to be done. It is unrealistic, however, to believe that courts can make a dent
in the patent notice problem through plenary de novo
review. To the contrary, such a standard undermines
the development of an informed record and cannot
override the established legal principles and a formal
rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6), supporting measured
deference to subsidiary factual determinations.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
A hybrid standard of appellate review of claim
construction rulings would leverage district court
judges’ special ability to develop the evidentiary record required to resolve the mixed fact/law controversies inherent in patent claim construction while
enhancing the quality of appellate review. According
greater deference to trial courts through clear error
review of the factual underpinnings of claim construction rulings that are supported by sound evidentiary
processes, properly documented records, and transparent reasoning would promote more systematic,
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well-founded claim construction analysis. Combining
deferential review of factual findings with de novo
review of the overarching claim construction determination – focused on ensuring that claim construction comported with the intrinsic evidence and on
ensuring that the trial court followed generally applicable rules of claim construction – would provide
the appropriate appellate safeguard.
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